inconsistent. Paul Hammer characterizes Elizabeth's responses to the crises in the Low Countries as a "zigzag of different" ("even contradictory") maneuvers. Wallace McCaffrey and R. B.
Wernham agree that England's "hesitations and gyrations" do not pass as coherent, creditable policy. Charles Wilson scolds Elizabeth for being timid and tepid--incapable of enthusiasm for "a great cause." But David J.B. Trim's striking counterthrust depicts the queen's overtures to Netherlanders as part of her courageous--and "confessionally driven"--foreign policy; Trim replaces "hesitation" and "zigzag" with a coherent "Protestant programme of action prioritized by the Elizabethan government" with the aim of improving prospects for "Calvinist internationalism." 2 What follows is an alternative to all these characterizations, one that, as noted, finds evidence for greater consistency and coherence in Elizabeth's leadership and less confessional "drive." That she would have been uneasy around religious extremists ought not to astonish us; her father's, step-brother's, and step-sister's reigns as well as the start of her own were disturbed by zealous subjects, who were bent on shoring up or dismantling the realm's religious settlements.
--------------------------------------------------

Conflict and Coalitions
During the 1570s, King Philip's ambitions to keep the Netherlands Catholic and to win England back for Rome coupled the fate of the Dutch rebellion with that of Queen Elizabeth's regime. Philip had married Elizabeth's half-sister and predecessor Mary Tudor in 1554 and had lived in their realm for thirteen months, but he was occupied elsewhere when she died in 1558.
He never returned to his wife's realm. When Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots, sought refuge there and seemed a plausible, Catholic candidate to succeed Elizabeth, Philip's envoys conspired to improve her chances. But Spain had more pressing business on the Continent in the 1560s and thereafter.
For Dutch dissidents opposed King Philip's proposals to increase the number and decrease the size of dioceses. The reorganization would have cost influential abbots healthy portions of their endowments and would have diminished the Dutch nobility's considerable influence over local churches. The protests of those likely losers led to the recall of Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle, the Low Countries' leading prelate (and principal architect and advocate of the plan). Yet dissidents' demands escalated. They prevailed upon Philip's regent, Margaret of Parma, to suspend all decrees against heresy, but the religiously reformed preachers--forced from pulpits into nearby fields--in retaliation, incited their "sheep" to sack Catholic churches. Still, the fear that King Philip meant to export the Spanish Inquisition to the Netherlands and that Spanish sovereignty would trump traditional Dutch liberties prompted many Calvinists and Catholics to make common cause. Margaret urged Philip to come and ease tensions; he had toured the Low Countries more than a decade before and had been well received. But the king sensed that the crisis called for more than royal processions and receptions. So, in 1567, he dispatched Don Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, duke of Alba, who quickly earned a reputation for ruthlessness. 3 Prince William of Orange and his brother, Louis of Nassau, rallied the resistance, but Alba's feints and dodges denied the rebels anything remotely resembling the decisive victory that could have inspired widespread Dutch and foreign support for the insurrection. William's initiative was frustrated at nearly every turn and has been called a military and public relations "fiasco." 4 By contrast, rebel mariners had significant successes at sea. Elizabeth permitted them ("pyrates," according to Alba; "sea beggars" to their friends) to resupply in several of her realm's John's imminent invasion reached them. 18 Perhaps to prevent his celebrity from deflating the queen's confidence in Prince William's abilities, the realm's ultra-Protestants expressed fresh confidence in his resourcefulness. Yet, as their sovereign's eyes, ears, and advisers, they were also obliged to report challenges that appeared to overtax his gifts and resources: he could not keep Calvinist troops from misbehaving while defending predominantly Catholic regions, and his strategies for reconciling disaffected Catholic rebels and Calvinist extremists and for forging a united front against Spain were ultimately undermined by the "particularism" that plagued the seventeen provinces, especially as regional resentments were exacerbated by confessional commitments. 19 Despite his efforts, the latter were turning the insurrection into a series of civil wars. 20 One pamphleteer portrayed Prince William as a Dutch Brutus, admirably bent on contesting Caesar's (King Philip's) right to reign yet finally and woefully incapable of achieving a consensus among those Catholics, Calvinists, Gelderlanders, Ghentois, and others, whose reciprocal antipathies gave Spain reasons to believe that its commanders could ultimately divide and reconquer. 21 The English government, informed of all this, was unlikely to think that William was flirting with success. Francis Walsingham's copybook mentions that "dissensions in the [Low] Countries" vexed delegates to the Estates General, trying to collect revenues for collective defense--"dissensions" that resulted in defections. 22 Defections were common after Alexander Farnese, prince of Parma, joined forces with Don John and after Spain's decisive win at a battle near the village of Gembloux in early 1578.
Most rebel casualties were Catholics, but, as Rolf Bremmer suspects, Gembloux was "a heavy blow" for all insurgents to absorb (een geduchte klap). 23 Setbacks followed: Gravelines soon capitulated to Don John; Parma took Maastricht. The year 1578 would be critical for William and Elizabeth.
- certain that "never before or after, in the correspondence among themselves" did Leicester and
Walsingham "do less to disguise the fact that they had the greatest difficulty in inclining their queen to their way of thinking." 33 Walsingham, who was abroad at the time, was cautioned to keep his displeasure under wraps. 34 So, with little prompting from her subjects who displayed greatest interest in international Protestantism, their queen determined that her realm's safety depended on Dutch rebels' abilities to preoccupy the Spanish, which, in turn, depended on Anjou's participation in their insurrection. And she seems also to have decided that flirting with the duke--perhaps marrying him, if it came to that--looked to be a last brass, if the scales needed tipping to that end. 35 Or was it love? Was Elizabeth as seriously smitten as Ilona Bell suggests? Bell finds the queen's letters to Anjou "heavy with the language of love" A sonnet "On Monsieur's Departure"
that Bell attributes to Elizabeth casts the narrator as a second Dido. 36 Yet we cannot be confident that the queen had a hand in that sonnet's composition, and the rhetoric of the letters, which may have been literary exercises, seems too slender a thread to support the idea that the usually strategic, spinster queen was pining for a duke, twenty years her junior. But this is not to question that Elizabeth was in love with being courted. Nearly all historians writing about the courtship's early innings concede that she enjoyed her young suitor's attention, and most who attend to its late phase (from summer, 1578 to the duke's death in 1583) mention her romance with romance. But Bell's slender thread is the only support for objections to the generalization that, on matrimonial matters, Elizabeth usually led with her head, not with her heart. 37 Nor did her faith dictate her policy. She seems not to have been tempted in 1578 by the ultra-protestants' efforts to cobble together an international Calvinist coalition. Conceivably, she rekindled Anjou's interest in marriage that year to explore an alternative. Maybe the Angevin courtship was part of an ambitious yet relatively low-cost plan to "breed pikes" in the - 45 To the end of that decade--and probably to
William's assassination in 1584, Elizabeth saw things differently; so she put off the Spanish,
propped up the Dutch--to a point--and kept wars from her shores.
